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Upon the foregoing papers, it is ordered that the petition is decided in accordance with the
accompanying memorandum.
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I

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF Y O R K
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

Index No.: 401 345/0Ci
LEOPOLD S IAO-PAO, 82B697,

DECISION, ORllER &
JUDGMENT

Petitioner,

For a Judgrncnt Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law & Rules,

Respondent.

4

,

KORNREICH, SHIRLEY WERNER, .T.

In this Article 78 proceeding, petitioner challenges a determination of the New York State
Board of Parole ("Board"), dated August 16, 2005 (Determination), denying his applicatioii for

parole for the fourth time.' Followbig a guilty plea, petitioner was convicted on August 29,
1982, of the offenses of second degree murder and f i s t degree robbeiy. The criiiies werc

comniittcd when peti tioner was nineteen years old. Petitioner was sentenced to coilcurrent term

of incarceration of-eighteen years to life for the murder and eight years and three rnonll-ts to
twenty-five years for the robbery. At the time of the Detcrrninatjon, petitioner was foor-ty-thiw
years old and had scrved just under twenty-three years of his sentence.

Petitioner challenges the Determination on the following grounds: it relicd upon
erroneous factual information; it failed to consider the factors set forth in Executive Law 4259-

'This court denied rcspondent's motion to change venue and gave respondent thirty days
to aiiswer the petition.
1

[* 3 ]

i(2)(c)(A); i t was an usurpation of the jurisdiction of the sentencing court bccause it essentially

substituted ii new and longer sentence; it imposed an excessive penalty; it was ex post fcrclo in

that it was based on a new policy of the Board that was not contemplated at the tiinc of
petitioner’s plea bargain; that procedural changes set forth in 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8002.2(b>incrcasinz
the nuinber or int.eivIewers allowed to questiori petilioiier were adopted without approprink rule-

niaking procedures; the Coinrnissioi~er’sWorksheet was not properly signed or fillcd out so as lo
indicate the fuctors used to deny petitioner parole or the decisions of all persons taking p a i l hi Lhc

decision; and members of the parole board whose terms had expired took part in h e

Determination.

The Detenninatioii denied petitioner’s application for parole with the following writtcn
decision :

AFTER A REVIEW OF THE RECORD AND THIS INTERVIEW, PAROLE IS
DENJED. THE INSTANT OFFENSE, MLRDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE
ANI) ROBBERY IN THE FIRST DEGREE, O C C U W D WHEN DURING
THE COMMISSION OF A ROBBERY, YOU CAUSED THE DEATH OF A
MALE VlCTLM BY STABBING HIM WITH A KNIFE. THIS CRIME
REPRESENTS AN ESCALATION OF YOUR ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR.
YOUR INSTITUTIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS AND POSITIVE DISCIPLTNARY
RECORO ARE NOTED AND CONSlDERED. THE BOARD FINDS YOUR
PROPENSITY FOR VIOLENCE AND INDEFERENCE FOR THE LAW AS
AN INDICATOR OF YOUR LJNSUJTABILITY FOR RELEASE AI‘ THTS
TME.
The Deteiinination indicates that the Commissioners unanimously dciiied petitioner’s

application.

The Board interviewcd petitioner and petitioner’s inental health was cvaluatcd by ;I social
worker prior to the issuance of the Determination. The interview revealed that pctilioner 113s 110

living parents, is estranged fiom his two sibiings, and plans to become a truck drjvcr if lie is
2
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paroled, but lie had 110 definite job offer or place to live, although he was planning to apply to a
government prograin for a supervised living situation. Petitioner has not becn disciplined reivjalent offenses while in prison, where he earned a High School Graduate Equivaleocy Dcgrcc,
attended an Alternative to Violence Program, and participated in Aggressivc Replacemelit

Training, as well as some vocational training. Petitioner has worked as a law librarian Tor a
substantial time whjle in prison.
Thc purolo interviow focused largely on the fact that petitioner stabbed the murder vicljiii.

The record demolistrates that the victim was stabbed twice. However, the intervicw transcript

indicates that one member of t h e Board exaggerated the violence of the crime during the
iiiterview. Pctitioner maintained that he was holding the knife used in the robbery whilc he

attcmptcd to thwad a fight between his co-defendant and the victim, who was stabbed
accidenlally. Petitioner admitted that it was reckless to hold the hijfc in his hand while 11-yiiig10
break up a fight. However, Commissioner Bogey, the main interrogator at the parole interview,
apparently was under the impression that the victim was stabbed repeatedly:

stabbing somebody one time is one thing, but to stab him again and aguiji, that
takes effort, it takes force, that’s a little more than just stopping a fight ....
(emphasis supplied)
See,

Transcrip hterview, dated August 2005, Respondents’ Crass-Motion to Changc VCJILE,

Exh. C .

On the other hand, the record also reflects that at the intei-view, petitioner was lcss than
candid and not sufficiently remorseful or insightful. He denied seeing blood on the kiiifc a t k r
the stabbing, in contradiction to his confession and several earlier stalemenls thal he rioticcd thc
blood j us1 after the, stabbing, as he was leaving the scene of the crime. He justi ficd his
3
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iiivolvemcnt in the stabbing by saymg that he was unemployed and without family support,

circumstances with which he will be faced if released. Petitioner repeatedly described the crime
in terms thal implied that he feels that he was a victim of an unintended

O U ~ C O I ’ H ~rather
,

than

accepting rull responsibility for a stabbing that was a foreseeable coilsequence of robbing

someone a1 kni fe-point .
In an Article 78 proceeding, the Supreme court’s scope of review is limited to deciding
whathcr there is mzy rational basis €or the determination ofthe agency. Pelf I).

Board of

Educcition, 34 N.Y.2d 222,231 (1974); In the Matter of Campo Gorp. v. Feinberg, 270 AD 302;
1 I O NYS2d 250 (3d Dept. 1952), ufflmzed, 303 N.Y. 995 (1952). If the deteimiination has any

rational basis that would appeal to a reasonable mind, and has any support in the record, it cnniiot

be held by thc court to be arbitrary and unreasonable. In the Matter ofCcrnipo Corp 1).
Feinherg, supra.

Ln reviewing decisions of the Parole Board, a court should not interfere unless tlicre is a
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Marino v. Truvis, 289 A.D.2d 493 (76 Dept.
200 1). The Parole Board must consider the seriousness of the offense, including the
recommendations of the court and prosecutor, mitigating and aggravating factors, and the

prcsentence report; any prior criminal record; the adjustment to confinement; whether thcrc is B
reasonable probability that if the inmate is released he/she will remain a1 liberty without violating

the law; whelber the inmate’s release is incompatible with lhe welfare of society; and wliethcr
release will not so deprecate the seriousness of the clime as to undermine respect Tor the law.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8002.1 . Other factors relevant lo pcljlioiier tliat

respondent was rcquired to consider in making the Determination were petitioncr’s: ! )
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institutional rccord, including educational achievements, vocational training, therapy, work
assignments, and interpcrsonal relationships with staff and inmates; arid 2) release plans.’ 9

N.Y.C.R.R. 8002.3. The Board i s entitled to consider an inmate’s lack of insight or
miniiiiization of the crime. Salmotz v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477 (2000). It is not iiecessary for
thc Board to mention all of the factors it considered i n its decision if the record as a wholc

dcmonstrates that the appropriate factors were considered. Matter of Wlrlkman 1’. T r m x ~I ,8
A..D.3d304,308 (1 ‘‘ Llept. 2005); Muller ofKing v. Div. q f P a m l e . 190 A.D.2d 423, 43 I (1

“

Dept. 1993). The factors need not he given equal weight. Id. However, respondents may liot

rely exclusively on the severity ofthe crime. Mutter of Walkmcln v. Truvis, supiw at 307.
There is a rational nianner in which to interpret the Determination’s reference lo an
“escalation” of anti-social behavior, which is the allegedly erroneous factual informal-ion which

petitioner cjteu. Petitioner argues that, as he has not committed any other crimes, and his
psychiatric evaluations did not find that he had a propensity for violence, thc Detcnniiiatioii was
irrational. Howcvcr, the reference to an “escalation” of anti-social behavior i s susceplible o r

interpretation as a reference to prior criminal behavior, a rclevant faclor, specifically p e t i t i u n ~ ” ~ . ’ ~
trespass and motorcycle equipment violations, that preceded petitioner’s murder and robbcry
convictions. Nor is it true that petitioner’s three mental health evaluatioiis specifically slalcd that

he had no propensity for violence. Rather they found that he denied having hoinicidal thoughts.
Commissioner’s Bogey’s exaggeration that the victim was stabbed “again ,and again,” standing
alone is not enough for this court to find that the Determination so irratioiial that i t bordcrcd 011

‘Other factors contained in 9 NYCRR 8002.3 do not apply, as pctitioiier did not earn a
Certificate of Eligibility aiid is not eligible for a lemporary release program.
5
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impropricty, cspccially in light of petitioner’s attempts to iniirimizc thc crimc atid h i s skctchy
release plans. The Determination explicitly considered petitiancr’s institutional record and

achievements in prison, while the interview probed his release plans and his insight about tlic
brutality of the offense. The record demonstrates that petitioner, who has spent h i s eiitirc adult

life in prison, still lacks honest self-reflection about the crime and did no! have scciire p h i s for.

eniploynient or housing. Based on the entire record, it was not irrational for respondents to
conclude that petitioner was unsuitable for release.

Petitioner is mistaken that the Determination extended the sentence imposed by thc court
in 1982. The sentences imposed had maximums of life imprisonnient and twenty-fivc ycars. As

petitioner had served twenty-thee years at the time of the Determination, respondcnt did not

increase petitioner’s scntcnce. There is no state or federal constitutional right to be rclcascd

fi.011-1

prison beforc serving one’s full sentence. Matter ofHyman v. Slate Div. of Pm-olc, 22 A.D.3d
224 (1 ‘‘ Dcpt. 2005). Moreover, at lis sentencing hearing, the prosecutor staled 011 the record

that “thcre is ti0 guarantee that he [petitioner] will be paroled at the expiration o r thc m i n i m u n i
time...,” Petitioner’s Rcply to Answer, dated August 8, 2006, Exh. D, p. 3.
It was not a violation of the State Administrative Act for respondent Dcnnison to wr-itc a

memorandum in 2004 mandating a panel of tluee commissioners to review the parolc applicaiioii
for all coiwicted murderers. See. Petitioner’s Memorandum ufLaw, dated April 1, 20M,

Addendum 13. The relevant rule, whkh was adopted in 1978, provides that the parole relcase
iiitervicw shall be conducted by “a panel of a l least two mcmbcrs of the Board of Parole.” {I

N.Y.C.R.R. 8002.2(b). Therefore, the memorandum did not enact a new rule.
Finally, it was proper for members of the Parole Board to act after the expiration of tlicir
6
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terms o f appointment. Members of the Parole Board are state public officels who may scrvc
until heir successors are appointed. The Govenior appoints members of the Parolc Board.

Executive Law, $259-(b)(1). A “state officer” includes every officer appointed by au officer lor
whom all electors of the slate are entitled to vote, which iiicludes officcrs appoiiited hy the

Governor. Public O f f i c ~ Law,
~ s $2. Officers holding over after the expiration o r their iippointcd
terms, with exceptions not relevant here, may continue to discharge heir- dutles uiilil a sticccssor

is clioseii and qualified. Puhlic: 0 f f i m - r Law, 55.
Pcti tioner’s remaining contentioiis have been considered by the court arid have bceri
found to be without merit. Accordingly, 11 is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the petition is denied with pl-ejudicc

Dated. September 7,2006
ENTER:
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